Can Child Marriage Law Change Attitudes and Behaviour? Experimental Evidence from an Information Intervention in Bangladesh by Amirapu, Amrit et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Amirapu, Amrit and Asadullah, M. Niaz and Wahhaj, Zaki  (2020) Can Child Marriage Law Change
Attitudes and Behaviour? Experimental Evidence from an Information Intervention in Bangladesh.
  EDI Working Paper Series .   pp. 1-72.
DOI




Can Child Marriage Law Change Attitudes and
Behaviour? Experimental Evidence from an
Information Intervention in Bangladesh∗
Amrit Amirapu† M Niaz Asadullah‡ Zaki Wahhaj
December 2020
Abstract
The practice of child marriage is ubiquitous in developing countries, where one
in three girls is married before the age of 18. Although most developing countries
have a legal minimum age of marriage, in practice marriage age is determined by
social norms rather than the law. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that formal
laws can inuence social norms and marriage behaviour in a setting with weak law
enforcement. We do this by administering a randomised video-based information
treatment that accelerates knowledge transmission about a new child marriage
law in Bangladesh. Our information treatments led to a change in participants'
own attitudes and behaviour (including reported attitudes regarding appropriate
marriage age and willingness to contribute to a charity that campaigns against
child marriage), but did not substantially inuence their beliefs about attitudes
or practices prevalent in their community. Follow-up surveys conducted 5 and 10
months after the intervention show an increase in early marriage among adolescent
girls within treatment households. These perverse eects are driven by households
where the father and family elders were informed about the new law but are absent
in households where only the mother is informed. The ndings highlight a) the
existence of informational frictions within housholds and b) the risk of a backlash
eect against a law that contradicts traditional norms and practices.
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1 Introduction
The practice of early marriage is ubiquitous among women in developing countries,
with one in three marrying before the age of 18, typically in their adolescence (UNFPA
2012). Recent work has shown that the practice has adverse consequences both for
the women who experience it and for their families, in the form of lower educational
investments, lower human capital investments in the next generation, adverse health
eects from early child bearing and worse social networks.1
Most countries have a legal minimum age of marriage although exceptions are al-
lowed, typically when parents, a judge or a community elder give consent (UNFPA
2012, Pew Research Center 2016). A number of countries have recently introduced
harsher penalties for early marriage and/or raised the minimum age of marriage. Given
the problem of weak law enforcement capacity in developing countries, it is not clear
whether such legal changes can be eective. This is particularly dicult in situations
where laws conict with social norms, depriving them of the support and cooperation
of the local population (Platteau and Wahhaj 2014; Acemoglu and Jackson 2017). In
South Asia, for example, there are strong social pressures to marry from the onset of
puberty (Ortner 1978, Dube 1997) and it is this custom rather than the law which often
dictates the age at which a woman marries. On the other hand, legal theorists have
argued that, distinct from the deterrence eects of legal punishment, the law may have
an expressive eect, i.e. it may shape behaviour by sending a message about society's
values (Sunstein 1996; McAdams 2000a; Benabou and Tirole, 2012).
In this paper, we address the question of whether a change in child marriage law can
inuence social attitudes and behaviour in a setting with weak law enforcement. We
do this by administering a video-based information intervention - conducted in June
2018 - aimed at accelerating knowledge transmission in rural areas about a new child
marriage law in Bangladesh (which was approved in the national parliament in March
2017).
1See Field and Ambrus (2008), Sekhri and Debnath (2014), Chari et al. (2017), Amin et al. (2018),
Asadullah and Wahhaj (2019), Sunder (2019).
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The video took the form of a short ctional drama involving the early marriage of
an adolescent girl that the study respondents viewed on a handheld electronic device. A
control group watched a version of the drama that made reference only to the pre-2017
child marriage law. A treatment group watched a version of the video that referenced
the new child marriage law, specically the introduction of harsher punishments for
facilitating early marriage. A second treatment group watched an alternative version
of the video that referenced both the harsher punishments in the new law as well as
a special clause in the law that permits child marriage in cases where the court gives
its approval. Apart from these informational dierences, the three versions of the
video were, shot by shot, nearly identical. The intervention was motivated, in part,
by evidence from the United States that providing individuals information about the
formal law may be sucient to shift their attitudes towards moral or social norms
(Chen and Yeh 2014). The intervention was randomised across households along two
dimensions independently of each other: 1) the video content and 2) whether or not the
relevant video was shown to family elders in addition to mothers of adolescent girls.
Immediately following the information intervention, we measured a range of out-
comes for study participants, including their views on appropriate marriage customs
and their beliefs about attitudes towards early marriage in their own community. At
the end of each individual interview, the study participants were given the opportu-
nity to contribute part of their remuneration for participation to a prominent charity
in Bangladesh that works on child marriage prevention. We conducted follow-up in-
terviews after ve and ten months to collect information on marriage outcomes for
adolescent girls who were unmarried at the time of the intervention.
We nd a large eect on contributions to the charity for the treatment in which
participants are informed about the harsher punishments for facilitating early marriage
in the new child marriage law (henceforth called `Treatment 1'): average contributions
increase by about 6 Taka (equal to 25% of the average contribution in the control group).
By contrast, we nd no eect, on average, for the treatment in which participants are
informed about both the harsher punishments and the special clause in the new law
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(henceforth called `Treatment 2'). We nd no eect of Treatment 1 on the appropriate
female marriage age stated by respondents, but those exposed to Treatment 2 report
a lower appropriate marriage age (by 0.2 years on average). We nd little eect from
either treatment on participants' beliefs about attitudes within their own community
towards child marriage.
In the case of marriage-related outcomes for adolescent girls in the treated house-
holds, we nd that Treatment 1 increased the probability of marriage by 7.2 percentage
points 5 months after the intervention and the eects persist after 10 months. The point
estimates for Treatment 2 are also positive but much smaller in magnitude and statisti-
cally insignicant. We obtain similar patterns when we consider alternative outcomes:
the probability of accepting marriage oers  or any steps taken towards marriage 
for the adolescent girls in question. Next, we show that these perverse eects of the
information intervention are absent in households in which only the mother of the ado-
lescent girl views the treatment video, but large and statistically signicant when the
video is viewed by both the mother and (separately) by other members of the extended
family  either the husband or a family elder.
These results have a number of implications for understanding whether and how the
law can inuence traditional marriage practices in a setting with weak legal enforcement.
First, we provide evidence that merely providing information about a new law can
change attitudes, behaviour and marriage-related outcomes. However, the ndings also
highlight the possibility of a `backlash' eect against a new law, as the intervention
led to an acceleration of marriages for adolescent girls, the very behaviour that the
law was meant to discourage. Third, the results show that there is an absence of
information-sharing within the family unit, and that the strategic interests of mothers
of adolescent girls are not aligned with those of the father or family elders. We argue
that the 'backlash' eect we observe may be due to a perception of an increase in future
enforcement of the law and/or state support for agency among adolescent girls.
Our study contributes to a growing literature that shows how information-based
interventions impact entrenched attitudes and social behaviour. Vogt, Ahmed, Fehr and
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Eerson (2016) study the eects of a video-based information intervention on attitudes
towards female genital cutting in Sudan, and show that movies that reected divergent
views regarding the practice improved attitudes towards uncut girls. Banerjee, La
Ferrara and Orozco (2019) show that a television series that combines entertainment
and education can shift attitudes and behaviour related to HIV/AIDS in urban Nigeria,
primarily due to improved knowledge about HIV. Green, Wilke and Cooper (2018) study
a mass media campaign in rural Uganda on violence against women, and show that
educational lms led to increased support for whistle-blowing against such behaviour
without aecting the viewers' core values. Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott
(2020) show that men in Saudi Arabia substantially underestimate support for female
work outside of the home and that correcting these beliefs in an experimental setting
leads to increased job search by their wives. To our knowledge, ours is the rst study
to investigate whether providing information about the formal law can aect social
attitudes and behaviour in a setting with weak legal enforcement.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide more
details on child marriage laws and marriage practices in our study setting, and present a
conceptual framework to explain how information about the law can aect perceptions
and social behaviour. In Section 3, we describe the experimental design and the surveys
conducted to collect information on marriage-related attitudes and behaviour. We
present the results in Section 4 and discuss their interpretation in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Study Context and Theory
2.1 Contextual Background
Bangladesh has one of the highest rates of female child marriage in the world: according
to a recent survey, 59% of women aged 20-24 were married before the age of 18 (NIPORT
2016). Based on this measure, only Chad and Niger have a higher incidence (UNFPA
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2012).
In the last three decades, there has been a substantial decline in the prevalence of
very early marriage among women in Bangladesh: While close to half of women born
in the 1970s were married by the age of 15, the proportion was close to 20% for women
born in the early 1990s (Wahhaj 2018). However, a signicant proportion of adolescent
girls continue to marry at 16 or 17, below the legal minimum age. Raj, McDougal
and Rusch (2012) estimate, using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys that
there has been an increase in marriage among girls aged 16-17 years from 15.2% in the
early 1990s to 20.6% in the mid-2000s. In contrast to girls, marriage below 18 is very
rare for boys. In the 2005 Bangladesh Adolescents Survey, based on a representative
survey of adolescents and young adults (see Gani 2007 for further details), only 3% of
men aged 20-24 years were married below the age of 18, compared to 70% of women in
the same age group.
Arranged marriages are the norm. Parents, family elders and other members of the
extended family play an inuential role in the choice of marriage partner, particularly
in the case of rst marriages and their opposition to a match can give rise to long-term
tensions within the family (Dube 1997; White 1992). In the 2014 Bangladesh Women's
Life Choices and Attitudes Survey (2014 WiLCAS  described in greater detail below),
83% of married women reported that their marriages had been arranged by their parents
or other relatives (Asadullah and Wahhaj 2016).
Until recently, the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 set the legal minimum age
of marriage at 18 for women and 21 for men. The law specied that taking part in
or facilitating a child marriage was a punishable oense but the punishment itself was
relatively mild  imprisonment up to one month or a ne of 1000 taka (USD 12.50).2
This law was in place for nearly 90 years before being revised in February 2017. There
are two key changes in the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017. First, the punishment
has been made much more severe  2 years' imprisonment or a ne of 100,000 taka (USD
2The Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929 is available here:
http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=149
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1,250) or both for any adult who marries an under-aged person. For the rst time, the
underage boy or girl also face punishment  1 month's imprisonment or a ne of 50,000
taka (USD 625) or both. On the other hand, an exception clause has been introduced
that would enable parents or guardians to marry o boys and girls before they reach
the legal minimum age if a court rules that this is in the best interest of the child.
No age limit has been specied for the exception clause.3 In the debates leading up
to the passage of the new law, child rights activists repeatedly argued that the clause
would make it more socially acceptable to marry o underage girls, perpetuate gender
inequality in child investments and facilitate forced marriages.
Using data from the 2014 WiLCAS, we nd that 88% respondents were able to
state correctly the legal minimum age of marriage at that time (18 years) and 81%
were able to state the nature of the punishment for violating the legal minimum age
(the guardian or father would be jailed or ned). Those who correctly stated the
legal minimum age were nearly twice as likely to indicate 18 as the appropriate age of
marriage for a girl (67%) compared to those who did not (34%). Therefore, women
in Bangladesh had a high level of awareness of the previous minimum age law, and it
served as an important reference point, at least when answering questions about the
appropriate age of marriage. Furthermore, 70% of the respondents reported receiving
information about child marriage in the preceding 12 months from the print media,
radio, television, posters or community programmes. These gures are suggestive that
Bangladeshi women will eventually become informed of the revisions to child marriage
law.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
How can information about the new child marriage law aect beliefs or behaviour?
In the rst instance, knowledge about the new law can have an expressive eect, i.e.
sending a message about society's values (Benabou and Tirole, 2012; see also Sunstein
3Further details about the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017 are provided in this article:
http://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/bill-passed-okaying-underage-marriage-special-cases-1368451
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1996, McAdams 2000a). In the present context, the new law signals to the respondents
how the government, legislators, child rights activists and other stakeholders view child
marriage. Consequently, they may respond by adapting their behaviour to maintain or
win the approval of their peer group or individuals in positions of authority. Thus, the
law would aect both respondents' beliefs about the community's attitude as well as
their expressed attitudes.
Secondly, the new law can serve as a new focal point (Auriol, Camilotti and Platteau
2017; see also Mackie 1996, 2000; Mackie & LeJeune 2009; McAdams 2000b). More
precisely, respondents may believe that it will serve as alternative focal point, and
thus lead them to change their behaviour (e.g. their expressed attitudes, their support
for early marriage versus further education for adolescent girls within the community,
marriage decisions of their own daughters, etc.) even if it does not aect their attitudes
 or beliefs regarding the attitudes of others  towards the practice that is endorsed or
prohibited by the law.
When formal law enforcement is weak, agents in the community can have an im-
portant role in shaping the custom; e.g. in the form of whistle-blowers (Acemoglu and
Jackson, 2017) and in the form of a customary authority (Aldashev, Chaara, Platteau
and Wahhaj 2012a, 2012b). Both agents are important in the context of child marriage
practices. The whistle-blowers can be the adolescent girl's school friends, teachers,
neighbours, etc. who contact paralegal organisations or law enforcement authorities.
The elders within the extended family  whose blessing is deemed necessary for deci-
sions regarding marriage, schooling, etc.  would constitute the customary authority.
These agents may be more supportive of the formal law when it is close to the custom
as compared to when it is very distant.
It is important to note that these theories may predict, under certain circumstances,
a backlash eect from a legal change, i.e. a change in behaviour or expressed attitudes
that runs contrary to the direction of the legal change. For example, a legal change that
expands the range of behaviour that falls outside of the law can reduce whistleblowing (if
non-compliant individuals cannot engage in whistleblowing) and thus increase the type
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of behaviour that the legal change was meant to discourage (Acemoglu and Jackson,
2017).
Relatedly, in a dual legal system where one can seek recourse either in the custom
or the formal law, a customary authority may provide rulings aligned with the formal
law so that its subjects are not tempted to appeal to the formal legal system and,
thereby, challenge his authority. However, if the formal law becomes so distant from
the customary practice that people will inevitably make use of the former, then the
customary authority (the family elders in the present context) may revert to a more
traditional position in line with own beliefs (Aldashev, Chaara, Platteau and Wahhaj
2012b).
Chen and Yeh (2014) argue that, if the legal change creates the perception that the
practice that is prohibited by the law is, in fact, more common than it was previously
believed to be, then it may reduce the social stigma associated with the prohibited
behaviour and thus encourage more people to adopt the practice.
To investigate whether any of these potential mechanisms are triggered by the in-
formation intervention, we measure a variety of outcomes for participants in the exper-
iment. To explore whether there is an `expressive eect', we collect information about
participants' beliefs about attitudes towards early marriage among others, as well as
the prevalence of the practice, within their own community.
We gave participants the opportunity to make contributions to a charity that works
on child marriage prevention. Specically, the charity relies on whistle-blowing by
community members to identify and prevent potential cases of child marriage, and uses
whistle-blowing to law enforcement authorities as a last resort. Thus, contributions to
the charity constitute a measure of support for whistle-blowing activities.
To investigate whether the eects of the information intervention are mediated via
family elders  who, as discussed in Section 2.1, play an inuential role in marriage
decisions  we provide the treatment to other members of the extended family for a
randomly chosen subset of households (further details in the next section).
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3 Data and Study Design
3.1 Description of the Survey
The 2014 Women's Life Choices and Attitudes Survey (WiLCAS) is a nationally rep-
resentative survey of women in Bangladesh aged between 20 to 39 years with detailed
information about their marital histories, child-related investments, attitudes towards
marriage customs and traditional gender roles, access and use of information media,
social networks, as well as knowledge about child marriage laws.4 The survey was con-
ducted immediately before the start of the public discussions that culminated in the
Child Marriage Restraint Act of 2017 (CMRA 2017). Therefore, it provides an impor-
tant (and to our knowledge unique) snapshot of marriage-related social norms before
the move to revise child marriage laws was initiated.
To study how the passage of the CMRA 2017 aects social attitudes, a new round of
data collection was conducted in a subsample of the WiLCAS households in May-June
2018. We refer to this new survey as CiMLAS (Child Marriage Law and Attitudes
Survey). At the time of the new survey, the CMRA 2017 had been approved in parlia-
ment but courts were still awaiting instructions from the government on how the new
law should be applied in court cases. The new survey (CiMLAS) was conducted in 80
village clusters, selected from the original 391 WiLCAS rural clusters. The selection
of survey clusters followed a two-stage randomisation process. At the rst stage, 24 of
the 61 districts covered under WiLCAS were randomly drawn. At the second stage, 80
village clusters were randomly picked from the WiLCAS rural clusters located in these
districts. All female respondents from the original WiLCAS survey found in these clus-
ters were selected for individual interviews. This procedure produced a sample of 971
primary respondents.
The survey team also conducted parallel interviews with other members of the ex-
tended family who belong to the same household or are living in the same neighbour-
4Further information about the 2014 WiLCAS are available at the website www.integgra.org. See
also Asadullah and Wahhaj (2019).
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hood. The number of additional interviews per respondent was randomised, with an
equal probability of 0, 1 or 2 additional interviews. The additional respondents were
chosen from the following list, starting with the rst relative present at the time of
the interview, and continuing down the list until the required number of additional in-
terviews had been obtained: (a) father-in-law; (b) mother-in-law; (c) eldest brother of
father-in-law; (d) uncle-in-law; (e) husband's elder brother; (f) husband; (g) husband's
elder brother's wife. The relationships were specied in advance of the intervention
according to their importance, in the Bangladesh context, in the marriage decisions
of adolescent girls (see Section 2.1). A total of 786 interviews with relatives of the
WiLCAS female respondents were conducted during the survey.
At the start of the interview, respondents were informed that (i) the survey was
being conducted as part of a study to understand how much people know about the
law in Bangladesh regarding child marriage and their beliefs and attitudes regarding
the practice; (ii) the study was not related to any government or NGO programme and
that their responses would have no direct impact for them.
In all interviews, we began by collecting background information on the respondent.
This included information on the respondents' parental background; schooling; own
marriage history; exposure to information on child marriage through the media; knowl-
edge of child marriage law. In interviews with female respondents, we also collected
marriage-related information on their daughters. Next, we administered a randomised
information treatment and collected information on a number of attitudinal and be-
havioural measures relating to child marriage practices and traditional gender norms
(these are described in detail in the next subsection).
For female respondents who had unmarried adolescent daughters at the time of the
initial survey, we conducted two rounds of follow-up telephone interviews, 5 months
and 10 months after the initial survey. The purpose of these follow-up interviews
was to collect information on any steps taken towards marriage for daughters since
the information intervention, including groom search, responses to marriage proposals,
engagements and marriages.
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3.2 Experimental Design and Outcome Measures
The experiment consisted of two independently randomised treatments. First, we ran-
domised exposure to information about the new child marriage law. Information about
the law was conveyed through a short video drama of a hypothetical case of marriage
for a girl of 15. There were small variations in the story across dierent respondents
such that some were provided with information about the new law while others were
not. Specically, a control group (C) received information about the minimum age
limit for marriage and the punishment for violating the minimum age limit under the
old (CMRA 1929) law. A treatment group (T1) received information about the age
limit and punishments specied in CMRA 2017 but not the exception clause. A second
treatment group (T2) received information about the new law (CMRA 2017) including
the exception clause. The respondents were randomised into the T1, T2 and C groups
with an equal probability of being assigned to any one of the groups.
Primary respondents were also randomised such that either 0, 1 or 2 other mem-
bers of the extended family (living in the same household or in the neighbourhood)
received the same treatment as the primary respondent to whom they were related (the
procedure for selecting specic individuals from the household or extended family is de-
scribed in the previous subsection). The videos were displayed on a handheld electronic
device that the enumerators used to collect the survey data. For each respondent, the
enumerators initiated the video by tapping on a designated link embedded into the
questionnaire. The enumerators were not aware of the treatment/control assignment
of the respondents they interviewed and the video behind each designated link. Af-
ter the videos were administered, respondents were asked a number of questions to
check comprehension of the information contained therein, and the video was replayed
if comprehension was poor.
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3.2.1 Short-Term Attitudinal Outcomes
After the video had been shown, respondents were asked a number of questions to
measure their beliefs and attitudes regarding child marriage practices5 and traditional
gender norms6. Then, respondents were read out 3 vignettes regarding child marriage
where an adolescent girl and her family are faced with a dilemma involving an of-
fer/opportunity of marriage for the girl. In the rst vignette, Vignette A, an adolescent
girl in grade 9 receives an oer of marriage from a man from a neighbouring village. Vi-
gnette B describes a similar situation except that the girl's father has passed away, she
has younger unmarried sisters, and the oer comes from a man who has good economic
prospects (a career in the civil service). In Vignette C, the girl has a secret engagement
with a boy from her school, which her parents learn about from a neighbour. The vi-
gnettes were followed by questions on what the respondent would do if she/he were the
parent of the adolescent girl in the vignette, what other parents in the village would do
in the same situation, and what advice they would give to the parents of the adolescent
girl in the vignette. The text of the vignettes and the follow-up questions are included
in the appendix.
Following the vignettes, the respondents were asked to take an Implicit Association
Test to measure their implicit attitudes towards the practice of female child marriage;
i.e. to what extent do they make positive or negative associations with the custom
(further information about how the IAT was constructed and delivered is provided in
the appendix).
At the end of the interview, the respondents were provided with a token gift of
Taka 200 (approximately 2.50 USD) and the option of contributing all or part of this
amount to a charity that works on child marriage prevention. The portion of the gift
that was due to the respondent was awarded to him or her using an existing mobile
5For example: In your opinion, what is the appropriate age of marriage for a girl?; In your
opinion, what do most people in this village feel is the appropriate age of marriage for a girl?; What
do you think is the ideal age gap between a husband and a wife?
6For example: Boys require more nutrition than girls to be strong and healthy.; School education
is more important for boys than for girls..
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money transfer service in Bangladesh.
The charity in question acts on reports about planned marriages of adolescents be-
low the legal minimum age to provide legal counselling to the families involved. This
counselling takes place against the backdrop that the law enforcement authorities would
be informed if the parents decide to go ahead with the marriage in spite of the infor-
mation provided about the legal minimum age of marriage. As such, the NGO relies on
whistleblowing within the community for its activities and uses whistleblowing to law
enforcement authorities as a nal recourse. We use the amount that respondents chose
to contribute to the charity as a measure of their approval and support for whistle-
blowing activities regarding child marriage. Table 4 provides a brief description of each
short-term attitudinal outcome.
3.2.2 Follow-up Calls: Longer-Term Marriage Outcomes
The study team conducted follow-up telephone interviews in November 2018 and May
2019 respectively, i.e. approximately 5 and 10 months after the video information
intervention. During each follow-up survey, the team attempted to contact all 315
female respondents who had reported, at the time of the survey in May-June 2018,
having one or more unmarried daughters aged between 13 and 22. The team were
able to contact and successfully conduct interviews with 278 respondents in November
2018 (attrition rate of 12%) and 254 respondents in May 2019 (attrition rate of 19%).
During each interview, the respondent was asked, for each daughter, whether she had
been married since June 2018 and, if not, whether the family had taken any steps
related to the marriage process.7
The follow-up interviews produced a dataset with marriage-related information on
337 daughters (261 below the age of 18) in November 2018 and 305 daughters (234
below the age of 18) in May 2018.
7For example: Have you had discussions with your family about nding a groom for ... ?; Have
you or your family actively sought a groom for ... ?; Have you or your family had a marriage oer
for ... ?. A brief description of each longer-term marriage outcome collected is provided in Table 5.
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3.3 Description of the Data
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the female respondents from the WiLCAS
sample, while the corresponding tables for the additional respondents are provided in
Table 2. According to the gures in Table 1, the main female respondent is, on average,
about 33 years old, with 5 years of schooling. The vast majority (94%) are married
and about two in three married before the age of 18, i.e. below the legal minimum
age of marriage. Their parents had little education  on average, 3 years of schooling
among their fathers and less than 1.5 years of schooling among their mothers. About
one in three have an adolescent daughter below the age of 18 and thus the change in
the minimum marriageable age law is pertinent for them.
Table 2 shows that the additional respondents are, on average, about 50 years old.
About 62% of the sample  which includes the spouses, fathers-in-law and brothers-
in-law of the main female respondent  are male. The vast majority (about 86%) are
married and a third of them married below the age of 18. The parents of the additional
respondents had little education  on average, 2.23 years of schooling among their
fathers and about 0.93 years of schooling among their mothers.
The `2014 Norms Index 2' in Table 1 is constructed on the basis of the primary
respondents' responses in the 2014 WiLCAS to 5 statements designed to elicit their
attitudes towards traditional gender norms.8 Specically, the respondents were read
out ve statements on the allocation of resources between boys and girls, such as Boys
require more nutrition than girls to be strong and healthy and School education is
more important for boys than for girls. For each statement, they were asked whether
they strongly agreed, somewhat agreed, somewhat disagreed, strongly disagreed
or did not know. We combine the responses to the ve statements to construct two
indices. For the rst index, responses to individual questions were coded as 1 if the
respondent `strongly agreed' with the statement and 0 otherwise. For the second index,
responses to individual questions were coded as 1 if the respondent `strongly agreed' or
8Asadullah and Wahhaj (2019) use a similar index to investigate the eects of early marriage on
attitudes towards traditional gender roles.
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`somewhat agreed' with the statement. We construct the indices following a procedure
described by Filmer and Prichett (2000) using Principal Components Analysis. Higher
values of the indices reect attitudes more in line with traditional gender roles. Each
index is normalised such that the variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
1.
The tables also provide a snapshot of the respondents' knowledge about the law
prior to the intervention. A large majority of respondents are aware that there is a
legal minimum age of marriage and most were able to state it correctly (88% for the
female respondents and 83% for the additional respondents). About four out of ve
respondents were able to state the nature of the punishment for violating the legal
minimum age (the guardian or father would be jailed or ned).
When asked about exceptions to the law, about 10% of the primary respondents
(7% of the additional respondents) answered that there was an exception. Only ve
respondents, however, were able to name the special exemption clause in the 2017
Child Marriage Law, and two other respondents mentioned the possibility of a court
marriage; 13% of the sample of primary respondents (6.7% of additional respondents)
mentioned that an exception was possible if the parents wanted it or if the family
wanted it.
Respondents were asked when they had rst heard about the current law regarding
the minimum age of marriage. About 5% of the primary respondents (4% of additional
respondents) reported hearing about it in 2017  the year when the new law came
into eect  or later. Another 13% of respondents (both in the sample of primary and
additional respondents) reported hearing about it in 2015 or 2016, the two years during
which various versions of the new law were widely discussed and debated in the media.
These numbers put an upper bound of 18% for the proportion of respondents who might
have prior knowledge about the 2017 Child Marriage Law.
Finally, the respondents were asked whether they knew of any instances in which
the current law on child marriage had been implemented. About 35% reported knowing
of at least one such case.
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Based on these responses, we can conclude that the respondents had good knowledge
of the pre-2017 law regarding child marriage: specically, knowledge of existence, the
minimum age and the consequences of violating the minimum age law. On the other
hand, given that few respondents knew about the exception clause in the new child
marriage law, and the fact that most had learnt about the `current' child marriage law
before the new law was proposed or legalised, it appears that very few had knowledge
of the 2017 Child Marriage Restraint Act before the information intervention. Nearly
half of our respondents (47.6% of female respondents and 47.3% of the additional re-
spondents; gures not shown in the tables) report reading/hearing about child marriage
issues at least once during the previous 12 months from the radio, television, posters,
newspapers or community programmes, which suggests that information about the new
law is likely to reach them from one or more of these sources in the near future.
The variables included in Tables 1 and 2 are based on responses to questions
addressed to the respondents before they were shown the video on child marriage.
Therefore, a comparison of means provides an indication of whether the randomisation
achieved balance across the three groups. Table 3 reports p-values for a t-test of equal-
ity of means, for the full sample of respondents, between the control group and the
rst treatment group and between the control group and the second treatment group.
In all instances, we nd that the variable means are similar across the groups, with
p-values above conventional levels for detecting statistical signicance, indicating that
balance was achieved in assigning the respondent to the control or treatment groups.
As information on marriage-related outcomes was obtained only from a subsample of
the survey respondents  specically, female respondents with unmarried adolescent
daughters  we also check whether there is balance across the three treatment/control
arms within this subsample. These balance tests are shown in Table 19 in the Ap-
pendix. Here again, we nd that the variable means are similar across the groups, with
p-values above conventional levels for detecting statistical signicance.
It is worth noting that we nd substantial dierences between the mean values of
our respondents' stated beliefs about appropriate marriage rules and their beliefs about
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these norms in the rest of the community. For example, Table 20 shows that the mean
value of appropriate marriage age is 18.7 years for respondents in the control group,
while the corresponding mean value for appropriate marriage age in the village is 17.3
years. Similarly, in the case of the three vignettes describing hypothetical scenarios in-
volving a prospective child marriage, the proportion of respondents who would support
delaying the marriage is consistently higher than the proportion who believe that most
other parents in this village would also support delaying the marriage.
We hypothesize three possible reasons for the disparities between stated views and
beliefs about the views of others: (i) individuals have incorrect (biased) beliefs about the
overall support within their village for female early marriage; (ii) the survey respondents
exaggerated their own support for marriage postponement among adolescent girls; (iii)
the views of the survey respondents are not representative of the views of the wider
population within their villages. Our regression estimates in the next section provide
clear evidence for (i). We argue that (iii) is also plausible given that our village samples
do not constitute a random sample of the adult village population. Rather, our sample
design ensures that the majority of respondents are women in the age range 24-43 years
(55% of the overall sample). We address (ii) in Section 5, after presenting our estimated
eects of the intervention.
3.4 Truthful Reporting by Survey Respondents
Before reporting on the eects of the treatment, we consider whether respondents in
the survey were truthful in their answers and whether biased reporting may aect the
treatment eects we obtain. Reasons why the respondents may have withheld their
true opinions or actual behaviour regarding traditional marriage practices include: (i)
experimenter demand eects (Zizzo 2010; de Quidt, Haushofer, Roth 2018): specically,
interpreting the information provided in the videos as a signal of the objectives of the
study and the type of answers expected of them; (ii) social desirability bias: specically,
avoiding answers contrary to the law out of fear or discomfort in reporting such opinions
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or behaviour in a survey. To investigate whether responses to questions on attitudes and
beliefs may have been inuenced by experimenter demand eects, we make use of the
2014 WiLCAS, conducted with a subset of the same participants, in which respondents
were asked identical questions about their beliefs and attitudes regarding traditional
marriage practices. The 2014 survey was not specically about child marriage. The
questions on attitudes on marriage practices were posed in the middle of a three hour
interview which touched upon many dierent aspects of the lives of women in rural
Bangladesh.
By contrast, participants in the 2018 survey were informed at the outset that the
purpose of the research is to understand how much people know about the law in
Bangladesh regarding child marriage and their beliefs and attitudes regarding the prac-
tice. The information provided in the video-based interventions may have provided
further clues of the objectives of the study.
The video shown to the control group in 2018 provided information that most re-
spondents were already familiar with. In particular, the control video informed par-
ticipants about the minimum marriage age, and the legal punishment for violating the
minimum age threshold under the 1929 child marriage law. Nearly 90% of the primary
respondents (specically those who were interviewed in both 2014 and 2018) already
knew about the minimum marriage age law before they were shown the video. Ad-
ditionally, about 80% could name at least one of the punishments for violating the
minimum age rule.
Thus, while the control group participants received the same information and cues
about the purpose of the study as those in the treatment arms, they received little
information that they were not already aware of at the time of the intervention. Based
on this reasoning, we argue that if experimenter demand eects are present, these should
be captured in dierences in responses between the 2018 survey and the 2014 survey
for the control group participants.
In response to the question on the appropriate age of marriage for a woman, 52%
of the respondents give the same answer in 2018 as they did in 2014. Figure 1 shows
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the distribution of the change in the responses. While a signicant proportion of re-
spondents state a higher appropriate age of marriage in 2018 than they did in 2014, a
similar proportion state a lower appropriate age of marriage in 2018. The change in the
mean of the responses between 2014 and 2018 is -0.1225 years and is not signicantly
dierent from zero (a t-test of the equality of means of the survey responses in 2014
and 2018 returns a p-value of 0.30). Thus, the responses of control group participants
do not seem to have been aected by experimenter demand eects.
The treatment groups received the same information as the control group about
the purpose of the study and the legal minimum age of marriage (18 years). The video
shown to the participants in the treatment group was almost identical  shot by shot  to
that shown to the control group. The only dierences in information content between
the treatment groups related to the severity of the punishment and the exceptions
permitted - but this additional information does not map readily to specic answers
to the questions that they were subsequently asked. Therefore, experimenter demand
eects in the treatment groups are likely to be similar to those for the control group.
Next we turn to the issue of social desirability bias: whether responses may have
been biased by fear or discomfort in reporting behaviour contrary to the law. Respon-
dents to the 2018 survey were asked to provide information about the marital status and
marriage age of their own daughters. Of the marriages reported by the primary respon-
dents, the marriage age was below the legal minimum age (18 years) for 69% (N=159).
The median age of marriage for daughters aged 20-24 years was 17 years (N=69), which
is close to the national gure of 17.2 years obtained from the 2014 Bangladesh Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (NIPORT 2016). The high frequency of underage marriage
reported among their own daughters, similar to rates obtained from other sources, sug-




4.1 Short-Term Attitudinal Outcomes
To investigate whether and to what extent the intervention aected beliefs and attitudes
relating to child marriage practices, we take three approaches: (i) a comparison of means
across the two treatment groups and the control group; (ii) a simple regression model
where the outcome variable of interest is regressed on binary variables indicating which
treatment, if any, the respondent was exposed to, together with village xed-eects;
(iii) an alternative regression model where we include additional controls, including
parental characteristics, education, and prior knowledge regarding child marriage laws.
In what follows we focus on the third approach, but the results of approaches i) and ii)
are reported in the Appendix.9
Our baseline specication - following approach (iii) above - takes the following form:
yihv = α + βThv + dv +Xihv + εihv (1)
where yihv is the outcome variable for respondent i in household h in village v; Thv
is the treatment status of household h in village v; dv is a village-level dummy; and
Xihv is a vector of individual-level controls. We calculate standard errors using the
Eicker-Huber-White method.
The short-term outcome variables are as follows: (i) appropriate age of marriage;
(ii) whether a girl should have any say in choice of partner; (iii) ideal age gap between
a husband and a wife; (iv) respondents' beliefs about social attitudes towards young
versus older brides and parental expectations about daughters' marriage timing, within
their own community; (v) attitudes towards traditional gender roles based on a com-
posite index; (vi) response to vignette-related questions including own choice regarding
hypothetical marriage decision; (vii) beliefs about what choices others would make and
approval or disapproval of a particular choice; (viii) contribution of money (from a
9See Table 20 and Tables 23-29 respectively.
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token gift) towards a charitable organisation that works to discourage child marriage.10
The individual-level controls include age, gender, binary variables for primary school
completion, primary school completion by the respondent's mother, parental ownership
of half an acre of land or more, experience of marriage before 18, and having one or more
daughters between the ages of 13 and 17. We also control for the respondents' prior
knowledge of child marriage law by adding binary variables for whether the respondent
previously knew of the minimum age law, the punishment for marriage below the legal
age, and the exceptions allowed to the legal minimum age under the law; also whether
the respondent learnt about the current law after 2014 (when the government rst put
forward its plans to change the previous child marriage law) and have heard of child
marriage cases where the current law has been applied.
The results from this specication are shown in Tables 6-12, and are summarized
here. We nd a negative eect of the second treatment on the respondent's stated
appropriate age of marriage. The average eect is about 0.2 years and is statistically
signicant (at the 5% level) in both the basic regression model (Table 23) and our pri-
mary specication with controls (Table 6). By contrast, there is no eect on appropriate
age of marriage in the case of the rst treatment. We do nd that the rst treatment
reduces agreement with traditional gender norms (signicant at the 10% in the basic
regression model and at the 5% level in the model with controls) while the eect of the
second treatment is close to zero and statistically insignicant for this outcome (Table
8). There is weak evidence that informing respondents about the special clause in the
new law weakens their belief that the bride and groom should have a say in their own
marriage decision (Treatment 2 has a negative eect relative to Treatment 1, with the
dierence betwen the two coecients statistically signicant at the 10% level, in both
specications). We do not nd an eect on the ideal marriage age gap from either
treatment.
We nd no eect of either treatment on what the respondent thinks is the preferred
age of marriage in their village. We also nd no eect from either treatment on agree-
10Table 4 provides a list of all relevant short-term outcome variables, together with their denitions.
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ment with the statement that other parents in their community expect their daughters
to marry before 18. However, the second treatment lowers agreement with the state-
ment that others in the community think worse of girls who do not marry by 18. We
nd little eect of either treatment on response to the vignette-related questions except
that the second treatment lowers support for delaying marriage in the second vignette.
In the case of nancial contributions, we nd that the rst treatment increases
average contributions by about 6 BDT (for comparison, the control group mean for
this outcome is 24 BDT), an eect that is consistent across the two regression models
(Tables 12 and 29). By contrast, there is no eect on contributions from the second
treatment. We obtain similar results when using the natural logarithm of contributions
as the dependent variable (using the subsample of positive contributors; in column 3 of
Tables 12 and 29).
It is worth noting that prior knowledge about child marriage law  which respondents
were quizzed on before being shown the videos  is strongly correlated with the practice.
For example, knowledge of the age exception clause in the current law is associated with
less support for agency of the bride and groom in marriage, weaker support for marriage
postponement in vignettes B and C, and increased likelihood of donating to a charity
working on child marriage prevention (not reported). Although these correlations do
not necessarily imply a causal relation, they are suggestive that knowledge of the law
plays an important role in forming beliefs and attitudes.
4.2 Longer-Term Marriage Outcomes
Next, we investigate whether and to what extent the intervention aects child marriage
outcomes (actual marriages and steps towards marriage) after 5 months and 10 months.
As before, our primary specication involves regressing the outcome variable of interest
on binary variables indicating which treatment, if any, the respondent was exposed
to along with a set of controls including characteristics of the respondent and the
respondent's daughter, and the respondent's prior knowledge regarding child marriage
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laws.11
For these longer-term outcome variables, we use the respondent's daughter as the
unit of observation, limiting the sample to unmarried daughters aged between 13 and
17 years at the time of the intervention. The regression specication takes the following
form:
yjihv = α + βThv +Xjihv + Zihv + εjihv (2)
where yjihv is the outcome variable for daughter j of respondent i in household h
in village v; Thv is the treatment status of household h in village v; Xjihv represents
the characteristics of daughter j and Zihv the characteristics of respondent i. We do
not introduce village dummies in the specications because of the small number of
observations (261 after 5 months and 234 after 10 months) relative to the number of
villages (80). We calculate standard errors using the Eicker-Huber-White method.
The outcome variables indicate (i) whether the daughter is married at the time of
the interview; (ii) whether she has received an oer of marriage since the intervention;
(iii) conditional on receiving an oer of marriage, whether it has been accepted; (iv)
conditional on receiving an oer of marriage, whether it has been rejected; (v) whether
any steps have been taken towards the marriage of the daughter, including marriages,
acceptance of marriage oers, searching for a groom, discussions within the family about
searching for a groom (see Table 5 for further details).
Estimates from the regression model are shown in Tables 13 and 14. The estimates in
Table 13 indicate that the rst treatment increased the probability of marriage by 7.2%
points relative to the control group (statistically signicant at the 5% level) 5 months
after the intervention. For the purpose of comparison, the probability of marriage in
the control group is 1.2%. The rst treatment also increased the probability of receiving
a marriage oer by 13.3% points (signicant at the 10% level) and, conditional on an
oer, increased the probability that the oer was accepted by 20.3% (signicant at the
11In the Appendix we also provide a simple comparison of means across the two treatment groups
and the control group.
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1% level). We also estimate a 8.2% point increase in the probability of any marriage
steps due to the rst treatment (statistically signicant at the 10% level). In the case
of the second treatment, we also obtain positive coecients for all the marriage-related
outcomes but these are smaller in magnitude than the point estimates for the rst
treatment and not statistically signicant.
To investigate whether the treatment eects on marriage-related outcomes persist
over time, we repeat the regressions with outcomes 10 months after the intervention.
The estimated eects, shown in Table 14, reveal a similar pattern. The rst treatment
increased the probability of marriage by 7.1% points relative to the control group (sig-
nicant at the 10% level), and the probability of any marriage steps by 11.2% points
(signicant at the 5% level). The estimated eects for the second treatment are again
smaller and statistically insignicant with the exception of marriage oers received
where we see a large positive eect (20.7% points signicant at the 1% level).12
4.3 Exploring Mechanisms
To summarise the main results thus far, we nd that the rst treatment (i.e. informing
individuals about the law's new higher penalty associated with child marriage) increases
respondents' reported appropriate marriage age and nancial contributions to a child
marriage prevention NGO, but has little eect on other reported attitudes towards
early marriage and beliefs regarding the attitudes of others within the community.
Yet, the same treatment appears to accelerate steps towards marriage for the primary
respondents' adolescent daughters. These results present a puzzle that we attempt to
answer in this section with further analysis.
We begin by listing a number of possible explanations (which are not mutually
exclusive and not necessarily complete). First, it is possible that the respondents'
reported attitudes and beliefs do not represent their true beliefs  an issue discussed
12As a robustness check, we redo the estimation using the sample of girls aged 13-16 years at the
time of the survey, given that those who were aged 17 may have reached the legal minium age at the
time of the follow-up surveys. In this case, we obtain estimates very similar to those in Tables 13- 14.
These alternative estimates are not provided in the paper but are available upon request.
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in Section 3.4  or, at least, play no part in the marriage decisions made for their
daughters. Second, it is possible that the treatments aected behaviour through a
process not captured by the eects on short-term attitudinal outcomes discussed in
Section 4.1. Rather, the treatments likely aected some other beliefs that were critical
for the subsequent marriage-related decisions for their adolescent daughters. Third, the
treatment may have had dierential impacts on beliefs and attitudes across dierent
members of the extended family, with certain members of the extended family playing
a more inuential role in decisions related to marriage timing.
To address the rst possibility, we explore whether the respondents' reported ap-
propriate age of marriage during the June 2018 survey can predict the marriage of their
daughters 5 months and 10 months after the intervention. For this exercise, we use the
sample of all daughters between the ages of 13 and 22 who were unmarried at the time
of the intervention. We include the same controls  characteristics of the respondents
and daughters  as in Tables 13 and 14. We also include in these regressions a binary
variable indicating whether the justication provided as to why the stated age was ap-
propriate included reference to the legal minimum age. The results are shown in Tables
15 and 16. We nd that the respondents' reported appropiate age of marriage has no
association with the daughter's marriage 5 months after the intervention. However, it is
negatively associated with marriage 10 months after the intervention: an increase in the
appropriate age by one year is associated with a 3% point decline in the probability of
marriage (signicant at the 1% level). We also nd that the appropriate age of marriage
is negatively associated with the outcome any marriage steps both 5 months after the
intervention (increase in one year associated with a 2.5% point decline in probability,
statistically signicant at the 5% level), and 10 months after the intervention (increase
in one year associated with a 4.4% point decline in probability). The appropriate age of
marriage is also negatively associated with the probability of accepting a marriage oer
(both 5 months and 10 months after the intervention) and positively associated with
the probability of declining an oer (10 months after the intervention only). We obtain
similar patterns with the variable indicating whether the response makes reference to
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the legality of the age. While these correlations may not capture true causal eects,
they are suggestive that the appropriate age of marriage reported by the respondents
reects, at least to some extent, their true preferences.
The second possibility is that the rst treatment aects actual marriage-related
outcomes through a process not captured by its eects on short-term attitudinal out-
comes. Our estimates suggest that this is likely because the rst treatment raises
reported appropriate marriage age but increases the incidence of early marriage. We
cannot establish whether, and to what extent, there is a causal relationship between
reported appropriate marriage age and actual marriage practice, but it is very unlikely
that a preference for later marriage (as captured by a higher reported appropriate mar-
riage age) would lead to increased early marriage. This reasoning lends support to the
hypothesis that the treatments are aecting behaviour through a process not captured
by these short-term attitudinal outcomes.
4.3.1 Heterogeneous Treatment Eects
To address the third possibility presented at the beginning of this subsection, we in-
vestigate whether the treatments had heterogeneous eects on short-term attitudinal
outcomes. Specically, we modify equation 1 by interacting the treatment dummies
with the gender of the respondent. The estimates for this modied equation are re-
ported in Tables 32 and 33. We nd that the negative eect of the second treatment
on the respondent's reported appropriate age of marriage is being driven primarily by
the men. The point estimate for men is -0.635 years (signicant at the 1% level) while
the point estimate for women is -0.062 (statistically insignicant). For both genders,
the second treatment has a negative eect compared to the rst treatment and the
dierence between the two eects is statistically signicant at the 10% level. We do
not nd evidence of heterogeneity of treatment eects by gender for other short-term
attitudinal outcomes.
Next, we investigate whether there are heterogeneous eects of treatment on the
marriage-related outcomes of adolescent girls according to who in the extended family
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was exposed to the information intervention. Recall that, together with the primary
respondent  a woman aged between 24 and 43 years at the time of the survey in June
2018  a number of additional members of the extended family (0, 1 or 2, depending on
a random draw) were also interviewed and exposed to the same video-based information
(see Section 3.1 for further details). We exploit this variation to investigate whether
exposing members of the extended family to the treatment (in addition to the mother)
aects the marriage-related outcomes of adolescent girls. Specically we construct, for
each female respondent included in the June 2018 survey, a binary variable indicating
whether she alone had received the treatment (binary variable = 1) or her husband or
a family `elder' had also been interviewed (and consequently provided the same video-
based information; binary variable = 0). For this purpose, we dene a family `elder' as
the respondent's father-in-law, mother-in-law, husband's elder brother, husband's elder
brother's wife, father, mother, elder brother or elder brother's wife.
We modify equation 2 by interacting the treatment dummies with the binary vari-
able described above. The estimates for this modifed equation are reported in Tables
17-18. In the case of Treatment 1, the case where the husband and family `elders' have
been treated yield eects that are larger in magnitude than those reported in Tables
13-14 and statistically signicant. In other words, when information about the new
child marriage law is provided to the mother as well as other members of the extended
family, the treatment 1 has a strong eect on marriage-related outcomes 5 months and
10 months after the intervention. However, if the information intervention is limited to
the mother only, we can detect no eect from Treatment 1 (the sum of the coecient of
either treatment and the corresponding interaction term is close to zero and statistically
insignicant for both time horizons). In the case of Treatment 2, the eect of providing
information to the mother only on the probability of marriage and any marriage steps
are, once again, close to zero and statistically insignicant. When the husband or a
family 'elder' is provided the same information, the net eects are statistically insignif-
icant with the exception of any marriage steps 10 months after the intervention, where
the net eect is positive and statistically signicant (at the 10% level).
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5 Interpretation of Results
5.1 Understanding the Short-Term Eects
We consider whether and to what extent the results described above support any of
the alternative hypotheses regarding the potential eects of the formal law on reported
attitudes and short-term behaviour. In Section 4.1, we documented that receiving in-
formation about the new child marriage law aected certain of the respondent attitudes
(stated opinions regarding appropriate marriage age and traditional gender norms) as
well as willingness to contribute to an NGO that works on child marriage prevention.
These eects occur in the expected directions: Treatment 1 (information about the
harsher punishments in the new child marriage law) leads to higher contributions to
NGOs, while Treatment 2 (information about both the harsher punishments and the
exception clause) leads to lower stated opinions regarding appropriate marriage age. In
contrast, neither treatment arm had a robust eect on respondents' beliefs regarding
attitudes or practices prevalent in their community.
We argue that these ndings are not consistent with the expressive eect of the
law. The expressive eect involves, in theory, a shift in people's beliefs about atti-
tudes towards child marriage within their community. We nd little evidence of such
shifts in response to our information treatments. A focal point eect would result in
the respondents expressing  and acting in accordance with  their own beliefs when
informed that the law is in line with these beliefs; but would not necessarily involve
a shift in beliefs regarding community attitudes. The short-term eects are consistent
with such an explanation but if the minimum age law is indeed serving as a new focal
point following the intervention, it is dicult to explain the increase in early marriages
in the longer term. Therefore, we can also rule out the focal point eect.
Next, we consider the whistleblowing eect. Recall that Treatment 1 leads to
increased giving to an NGO that works on child marriage prevention, while Treatment
2 has no signicant eect. The NGO in question relies on whistle-blowing to identify
potential cases and uses whistleblowing to law enforcement authorities as a last resort.
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Thus, increased giving to the NGO in response to Treatment 1 can be interpreted
as increased support for whistleblowing activities when the respondent is informed
about the harsher punishments specied in the new law. The change in behaviour we
document may be due to reduced fear of reprisals within their community against such
behaviour. If such a mechanism is at play, the increase in early marriage in the longer
term seems more puzzling. We attempt to account for the latter eect in the next
subsection.
5.2 Understanding the Longer-Term Eects
Our results in Section 4.2 imply that informing adult members in rural households
in Bangladesh about the harsher punishments for child marriage stipulated in a new
law had a backlash eect; specically, an acceleration of marriages for adolescent girls
within the household, exactly the behaviour that the law was intended to discourage.
However, the eect is absent when only the mothers of the adolescent girls are informed
about the new law; it is large and statistically signicant when the father or an elder
within the extended family is also informed about the law alongside the mother (Section
4.3.1).
The rst implication of these results is that there is an absence of information-
sharing within the family unit. If the information provided to one member of the
family was routinely communicated with others, then it would not matter who within
the family was provided the information. This echoes ndings in the existing literature
which provides evidence on lack of information-sharing within the household.13 Cru-
cially, it means that when the mother is the only person within the household to be
informed, she withholds this information from other members of the family, implying
that the strategic interests of the mother are not aligned with that of the husband or
family elders.
To better understand these results, we revisit the theories discussed in Section 2.2,
13See Baland and Ziparo (2018) for a recent review of this literature.
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specically the dierent mechanisms through which the law can have a backlash eect on
attitudes and behaviour. Chen and Yeh (2014) argue that providing information about
a new law can produce a backlash if the law creates the perception that the behaviour
it prohibits is more widespread than previously believed. In the present context, we
nd that the information treatment did not change beliefs about the prevalence of child
marriage within the community (results shown in Table 36 in the Appendix).
Acemoglu and Jackson (2017) show that a legal change that expands the range
of behaviour that falls outside of the law can lead to reduced whistleblowing and,
thus, an increase in the behaviour that is legally prohibited. Most of our respondents
already knew the minimum age of marriage for girls at the time of the intervention
(88% among the primary respondents and 83% among the additional respondents).
For this subsample, the rst treatment would not have shifted people's perceptions
about the range of behaviour that falls outside of the law. Yet, when we re-estimate
the equations for the longer-term marriage outcomes with this subsample, we still nd
that the treatment increased the probability of early marriage (the point estimates,
albeit insignicant in some instances, are very similar to those obtained for the full
sample; results shown in Tables 37-38 in the Appendix).14 Additionally, the eects of the
information intervention on nancial contributions discussed in Section 4.1 suggest that
the rst treatment led to increased, rather than lowered, support for whistleblowing.
Aldashev et al. (2012b) describes another possible mechanism for a backlash eect:
customary authorities may respond to a progressive change in the law by reverting to a
more traditional position (see the discussion in Section 2.2). This mechanism requires
a shift in the formal legal position  not just the penalty associated with it  and, as
we have argued above, the rst treatment could not have constituted such a shift in
the case of respondents who already knew about the legal minimum age of marriage.
14Acemoglu and Jackson (2017) also show that a legal change that increases the penalty for behaviour
outside of the law can, under certain scenarios, also generate a backlash eect in a subset of the
population. But this mechanism involves increased compliance in another subset of the population.
Therefore, it is unlikely that this mechanism could account for the negative and large average eects
we observe.
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As mentioned above, restricting the sample to households where all respondents knew
about the minimum marriage age does not substantially change the estimated eects
of the rst treatment.
The information intervention may have aected perceptions about the likelihood of
enforcement of the minimum age law. Specically, if the rst treatment  information
about the harsher punishment only  led to the belief that enforcement would be weaker
under the new law, then this could explain why the treatment led to an increase in early
marriages.15 However, such a mechanism is unlikely to account for our ndings given
that the law was rarely enforced even before the change in child marriage law in 2017
(see Section 2.1).
Having ruled out the possible explanations above, we argue that the adverse eects
of the rst treatment may be due to a perception of an increase in future enforcement of
the law. If respondents believed that future enforcement of the law would be tougher,
this may have induced them to marry o their adolescent daughters more quickly than
they may have done otherwise.16 17 Alternatively, the rst information treatment may
have created the perception that the state would henceforth be more supportive of
agency among adolescent girls. Therefore, the family elders were incentivised to marry
o adolescent girls before they could take advantage of the changing social landscape
and demand more autonomy in choices relating to education, marriage timing, mar-
riage partner, etc. This mechanism would explain why the eects on early marriage
were weaker or absent when (i) the intervention also provided information about the ex-
ception clause; (ii) the information was provided only to mothers who, arguably, would
15Aldashev et al. (2012a) argue that a legal reform that moves the formal law further from the
custom may lead to weaker enforcement if it increases the likelihood of deviation from the written law
by the police, prosecutors, and judges.
16Demographers have oered a similar explanation for a spike in early marriages in the 1931 Indian
Census: in the late 1920s, parents had rushed to marry o their daughters before the 1929 Child
Marriage Act came into eect  a law which set the minimum age of marriage at 14 for girls 
believing that they had only a short window to continue with their traditional marriage practices (See
Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell 1983 and the references within).
17In a dierent but related context, Camilotti (2016) nds that legal sanctions against female genital
cutting in Senegal lowered the age of cutting; and attributes the change in age to de-ritualisation and
individualisation of FGC to lower the risk of detection and legal prosecution.
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be more supportive of agency among their daughters.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the question whether a change in the formal law regarding
child marriage can inuence social attitudes and behaviour in a situation characterised
by weak law enforcement. For this purpose, we made use of a new child marriage law in
Bangladesh which was recently approved by the national parliament and conducted a
randomised information treatment aimed at accelerating knowledge transmission about
the new law in rural areas. Immediately after the intervention, we measured a range
of outcomes for study participants, including their views on appropriate marriage cus-
toms and their beliefs about attitudes towards early marriage in their own community.
Follow-up interviews were conducted ve and ten months later, to collect information
on marriage outcomes for adolescent girls who were unmarried at the time of the inter-
vention.
We nd some evidence that the information intervention led to a change in partic-
ipants' own attitudes and behaviour, but did not substantially inuence their beliefs
about attitudes or practices in their community. The eect sizes we estimate are rela-
tively small but noteworthy given that it is based on a single information intervention
about the new child marriage law. Given that nearly half of our respondents reported
hearing about child marriage issues from media sources or community programmes in
the preceding 12 months (see Section 3.3), it is likely that our information intervention
is reinforced by other sources in the near term, thus providing the possibility that the
new law has a more sustained eect on attitudes and behaviour.
More worryingly, we nd that adolescent girls in households that were informed
about the harsher punishments stipulated in the new child marriage law were more
likely to experience early marriage  or other steps towards marriage such as the ac-
ceptance of a marriage oer  in the months following the intervention. These perverse
eects of the information intervention are absent in households where only the mother
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of the adolescent girl receives the information treatment; but the eects are large and
statistically signicant when the information is received both by the mother and (sep-
arately) by other members of the extended family.
Thus, the intervention had a 'backlash' eect against the new law, causing an ac-
celeration of marriages for adolescent girls, the very behaviour that the law was meant
to discourage. We argue that the 'backlash' may have been due to a perception of
an increase in future enforcement of the law and/or state support for agency among
adolescent girls.
Our ndings carry an important message for the design of future interventions and
programmes that make use of formal institutions to bring about social change on issues
where tradition and custom has hitherto played a dominant role. If the formal insti-
tutions are perceived as being contradictory to the custom, then the population may
respond in ways aimed at circumventing the state authority, with unintended conse-
quences for the intended beneciaries of the programme.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Primary Respondents)
mean sd min max obs
Age 33.36 6.07 20.00 58.00 971
Male 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 971
Schooling 4.99 4.04 0.00 16.00 971
Married 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 971
Married before 18 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 971
Employed 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 971
2014 Norms Index 2 0.00 1.00 -1.10 1.33 971
Father Schooling 3.02 4.06 0.00 16.00 971
Mother Schooling 1.42 2.53 0.00 15.00 971
Mother works 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 971
Father low pay 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 971
Half Acre Land 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 971
Adol. girl 13-17 0.34 0.58 0.00 3.00 971
Knows min age 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 971
Knows punishment 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 971
Knows age exception 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 971
Learnt law after 2014 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 971
Knows CM court case 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 971
Note: This table presents summary statistics of background characteristics for all primary re-
spondents. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (Additional Respondents)
mean sd min max obs
Age 50.37 11.30 24.00 75.00 786
Male 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 786
Schooling 2.80 4.06 0.00 19.00 786
Married 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00 786
Married before 18 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 786
Employed 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 786
Father Schooling 2.23 3.70 0.00 19.00 786
Mother Schooling 0.93 2.22 0.00 19.00 786
Mother works 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 786
Father low pay 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 786
Half Acre Land 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 786
Adol. girl 13-17 0.09 0.33 0.00 2.00 295
Knows min age 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00 786
Knows punishment 0.78 0.41 0.00 1.00 786
Knows age exception 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 786
Learnt law after 2014 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 786
Knows CM court case 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 786
Note: This table presents summary statistics of background characteristics for all additional
respondents. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Age 41.36 40.71 (0.36) 40.82 (0.46)
Male 0.29 0.28 (0.72) 0.26 (0.27)
Schooling 4.12 4.01 (0.68) 3.90 (0.36)
Married 0.90 0.91 (0.72) 0.91 (0.57)
Married before 18 0.52 0.48 (0.23) 0.52 (1.00)
Employed 0.35 0.35 (0.99) 0.34 (0.70)
2014 Norms Index 2 0.01 -0.01 (0.74) 0.01 (0.97)
Father Schooling 2.68 2.62 (0.80) 2.70 (0.94)
Mother Schooling 1.24 1.25 (0.95) 1.12 (0.39)
Mother works 0.09 0.07 (0.23) 0.07 (0.17)
Father low pay 0.23 0.24 (0.48) 0.23 (0.80)
Half Acre Land 0.46 0.49 (0.24) 0.46 (0.93)
Adol. girl 13-17 0.26 0.30 (0.30) 0.29 (0.52)
Knows min age 0.85 0.87 (0.21) 0.86 (0.67)
Knows punishment 0.79 0.81 (0.43) 0.79 (0.88)
Knows age exception 0.09 0.07 (0.23) 0.09 (0.63)
Learnt law after 2014 0.18 0.20 (0.43) 0.20 (0.25)
Knows CM court case 0.38 0.34 (0.17) 0.36 (0.48)
Observations 613 556 1169 588 1201
Note: This table presents average values of baseline characteristics by treatment status.
Columns 3 and 5 display p-values from a t-test of the dierence in means between the control
group and either the Treatment 1 (T1) or Treatment 2 (T2) group. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Table 4: Description of Short-term Attitudinal Outcomes
Variable Description
Approp. marriage age Appropriate age of marriage for girls/women reported
by respondent
Approp. marry b/f 18 = 1 if Approp. marriage age < 18, 0 otherwise
Approp. age gap Appropriate age gap between husband and wife
reported by respondent
Marriage Agency = 1 if respondent believes the bride and groom should
choose their own marriage partners, 0 otherwise
Vill. approp. marr. age Respondent's belief about appropriate age of marriage
for girls/women within his/her village
Vill. approp. marry b/f 18 = 1 if Vill approp. marr. age < 18, 0 otherwise
Marr a/f 18 bad = 1 if respondent believes his/her village thinks worse
of girls who marry above age 18, 0 otherwise
Traditional Norms Index Alignment of respondent's views with traditional
gender norms, composite index based on strong
agreement only
Traditional Norms Index 2 Alignment of respondent's views with traditional
gender norms, composite index based on strong or
moderate agreement
Vignette A support = 1 if respondent supports marriage postponement in
Vignette A, 0 otherwise
Vignette A others support = 1 if respondent believes other parents in village
would support marriage postponement in Vignette A,
0 otherwise
VA oth. approve support = 1 if respondent approves decision to postpone
marriage in Vignette A
Vignette B support = 1 if respondent supports marriage postponement in
Vignette B, 0 otherwise
Vignette B others support = 1 if respondent believes other parents in village
would support marriage postponement in Vignette B, 0
otherwise
VB oth. approve support = 1 if respondent approves decision to postpone
marriage in Vignette B
Vignette C support = 1 if respondent supports marriage postponement in
Vignette C, 0 otherwise
Vignette C others support = 1 if respondent believes other parents in village
would support marriage postponement in Vignette C, 0
otherwise
VC oth. approve support = 1 if respondent approves decision to postpone
marriage in Vignette C
Make Contribution = 1 if respondent make positive contribution to
charity, 0 otherwise
Contribution Amount Contribution amount in Bangladesh Taka
Note: This table provides a brief description of the main short-term outcome variables.
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Table 5: Description of Longer-Term Marriage Outcomes
Variable Description
Married = 1 if adolescent is married at the time of the
telephone interview
Received Oer = 1 if an oer of marriage was received after the June
2018 survey
Accepted Oer = 1 if an oer of marriage was accepted after the June
2018 survey
Declined Oer = 1 if an oer of marriage was declined after the June
2018 survey
Any Marr. Steps = 1 if any steps towards marriage of the adolescent
were taken after the June 2018 survey
Note: This table provides a brief description of each of the longer-term outcome variables.
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Short-Term Outcomes (Average Treatment Eects, with Con-
trols)









treatment 1 0.034 0.021 -0.007 0.005
(0.102) (0.020) (0.011) (0.024)
treatment 2 -0.194** 0.001 0.009 -0.036
(0.099) (0.019) (0.012) (0.024)
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 18.741 0.117 0.039 0.217
dep var sd 1.643 0.322 0.194 0.413
β1 = β2 0.024 0.337 0.177 0.093
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and a variety of controls (not shown).
The controls include respondent age as well as dummies for respondents' gender, marriage be-
fore age 18, primary education completion, mother's primary education completion, father's
owning more than a half acre of land, knowledge of the correct legal marriage age, knowledge
of the correct punishments for infractions of the child marriage law, awareness of the exception
clause, learning of the law after 2014, and knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" displays the mean / standard devia-
tion of the dependent variable in the control group. The last row reports the p-value from a
Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient
of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 0.024 -0.018 -0.009
(0.117) (0.028) (0.029)
treatment 2 0.128 -0.033 -0.061**
(0.109) (0.027) (0.028)
Observations 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 17.300 0.457 0.494
dep var sd 1.911 0.499 0.500
β1 = β2 0.375 0.590 0.070
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and the same controls from
Table 5 (not shown). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" dis-
plays the mean / standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. The last
row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2
(βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
Table 8: ATEs on Traditional Gender Norms
Traditional
Gender Norms Index 1
Traditional
Gender Norms Index 2
treatment 1 -0.074 -0.118**
(0.058) (0.059)
treatment 2 0.007 -0.049
(0.058) (0.057)
Observations 1757 1757
dep var mean -0.010 0.035
dep var sd 0.994 1.004
β1 = β2 0.171 0.235
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and the same controls from
Table 5 (not shown). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" dis-
plays the mean / standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. The last
row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2
(βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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approve if parents support
treatment 1 0.013 -0.025 -0.061**
(0.017) (0.028) (0.030)
treatment 2 -0.001 -0.013 -0.010
(0.017) (0.027) (0.029)
Observations 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 0.912 0.680 0.522
dep var sd 0.284 0.467 0.500
β1 = β2 0.386 0.656 0.086
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and the same controls from
Table 5 (not shown). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" dis-
plays the mean / standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. The last
row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2
(βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.






approve if parents support
treatment 1 -0.035 -0.012 -0.013
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
treatment 2 -0.060** 0.002 -0.007
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 0.620 0.315 0.299
dep var sd 0.486 0.465 0.458
β1 = β2 0.413 0.614 0.817
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and the same controls from
Table 5 (not shown). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" dis-
plays the mean / standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. The last
row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2
(βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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approve if parents support
treatment 1 0.016 -0.034 -0.031
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
treatment 2 0.014 0.018 -0.020
(0.027) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 1757 1757 1756
dep var mean 0.701 0.439 0.335
dep var sd 0.458 0.497 0.472
β1 = β2 0.946 0.089 0.692
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and the same controls from
Table 5 (not shown). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" dis-
plays the mean / standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. The last
row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2
(βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.







treatment 1 0.021 6.434** 0.160*
(0.028) (3.136) (0.083)
treatment 2 -0.010 -0.168 -0.059
(0.027) (2.630) (0.082)
Observations 1757 1757 719
dep var mean 0.395 24.189 3.639
dep var sd 0.489 49.400 0.985
β1 = β2 0.254 0.025 0.008
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators, including village xed eects and the same controls from
Table 5 (not shown). Standard errors are provided in parentheses. "dep var mean/sd" dis-
plays the mean / standard deviation of the dependent variable in the control group. The last
row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2
(βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
47
Marriage-Related Outcomes (Average Treatment Eects, with
Controls)










treatment 1 0.072** 0.133* 0.203*** -0.058 0.082*
(0.031) (0.070) (0.074) (0.128) (0.044)
treatment 2 0.025 0.068 0.110 0.095 0.045
(0.027) (0.070) (0.073) (0.129) (0.043)
Observations 261 261 112 112 261
dep var mean 0.012 0.369 0.032 0.645 0.060
dep var sd 0.109 0.485 0.180 0.486 0.238
β1 = β2 0.207 0.364 0.304 0.156 0.461
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators for a sample of female children aged 13 to 17 at the time of the ini-
tial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone survey conducted 5 months
after the initial CiMLAS survey. A variety of controls were included (but are not shown): age
of child, age at child at menarche, whether the primary respondent (PR) / child's mother was
married before age 18, PR's primary education completion status, PR's knowledge of the cor-
rect legal marriage age, PR's knowledge of the correct punishments for infractions of the child
marriage law, PR's awareness of the exception clause, PR's learning of the law after 2014, and
PR's knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The
last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and
T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 0.071* 0.054 0.167** -0.128 0.112**
(0.042) (0.079) (0.075) (0.089) (0.054)
treatment 2 0.038 0.207*** 0.042 -0.002 0.045
(0.042) (0.073) (0.066) (0.081) (0.050)
Observations 234 234 139 139 234
dep var mean 0.036 0.464 0.077 0.846 0.071
dep var sd 0.187 0.502 0.270 0.366 0.259
β1 = β2 0.519 0.042 0.134 0.154 0.259
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators for a sample of female children aged 13 to 17 at the time of the ini-
tial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone survey conducted 10 months
after the initial CiMLAS survey. A variety of controls were included (but are not shown): age
of child, age at child at menarche, whether the primary respondent (PR) / child's mother was
married before age 18, PR's primary education completion status, PR's knowledge of the cor-
rect legal marriage age, PR's knowledge of the correct punishments for infractions of the child
marriage law, PR's awareness of the exception clause, PR's learning of the law after 2014, and
PR's knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The
last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and
T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Do Answers to Attitudinal Questions Predict Marriage-Related
Outcomes?










Approp marriage age -0.010 -0.028* -0.036** 0.030 -0.025**
(0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.012)
Age approp b/c legal -0.067** -0.087 -0.148** 0.182* -0.125***
(0.026) (0.067) (0.074) (0.104) (0.042)
Observations 337 337 168 168 337
dep var mean 0.071 0.482 0.185 0.537 0.152
dep var sd 0.259 0.502 0.392 0.503 0.360
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes for a
sample of female children (aged 13 to 17 at the time of the initial CiMLAS survey) against two
measures of marriage-related attitudes held by the children's mothers (i.e. the survey's pri-
mary respondents): 1) the mothers' beliefs regarding appropriate marriage age and 2) whether
or not that age is appropriate because it is the legal marriage age. The outcomes were col-
lected from a follow-up phone survey conducted 5 months after the initial CiMLAS survey. *p
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Approp marriage age -0.030*** -0.019 -0.034* 0.051*** -0.044***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.013)
Age approp b/c legal -0.109*** -0.097 -0.185*** 0.217*** -0.098*
(0.037) (0.068) (0.069) (0.075) (0.056)
Observations 305 305 197 197 305
dep var mean 0.107 0.545 0.197 0.754 0.134
dep var sd 0.311 0.500 0.401 0.434 0.342
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes for a
sample of female children (aged 13 to 17 at the time of the initial CiMLAS survey) against two
measures of marriage-related attitudes held by the children's mothers (i.e. the survey's pri-
mary respondents): 1) the mothers' beliefs regarding appropriate marriage age and 2) whether
or not that age is appropriate because it is the legal marriage age. The outcomes were col-
lected from a follow-up phone survey conducted 10 months after the initial CiMLAS survey.
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Treatment Heterogeneity: Treatment of Primary Respondent
Only vs Treatment of Husband or Elder of Primary Respondent
in Addition










treatment 1 0.110** 0.130 0.279*** -0.170 0.146**
(0.045) (0.097) (0.101) (0.174) (0.062)
treatment 2 0.025 0.167* 0.112 0.140 0.045
(0.023) (0.098) (0.086) (0.161) (0.050)
only wife int. 0.024 -0.044 0.103 -0.295 0.035
(0.034) (0.100) (0.096) (0.213) (0.058)
treatment 1 -0.079 0.011 -0.184 0.303 -0.124
× only wife int. (0.062) (0.143) (0.156) (0.267) (0.088)
treatment 2 -0.002 -0.207 0.013 -0.123 0.007
× only wife int. (0.049) (0.139) (0.183) (0.286) (0.084)
Observations 261 261 112 112 261
β1 + β4 = 0 0.462 0.173 0.407 0.503 0.723
β2 + β5 = 0 0.615 0.687 0.399 0.940 0.455
β1 = β2 0.089 0.705 0.126 0.015 0.123
β1 + β4 = β2 + β5 0.871 0.062 0.849 0.532 0.670
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether only the pri-
mary respondent was interviewd and treated (in the base category, the primary respondent's
husband or family elder was also treated). The sample includes female children aged 13 to 17
at the time of the initial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone sur-
vey conducted 5 months after the initial CiMLAS survey. A variety of controls were included
(but are not shown): age of child, age at child at menarche, whether the primary respondent
(PR) / child's mother was married before age 18, PR's primary education completion status,
PR's knowledge of the correct legal marriage age, PR's knowledge of the correct punishments
for infractions of the child marriage law, PR's awareness of the exception clause, PR's learn-
ing of the law after 2014, and PR's knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. The last 4 rows report the p-values from a number of Wald tests (βi
corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 0.150** 0.108 0.241** -0.230** 0.188***
(0.059) (0.108) (0.099) (0.109) (0.071)
treatment 2 0.060 0.293*** 0.061 -0.082 0.106*
(0.045) (0.101) (0.075) (0.096) (0.062)
only wife int. 0.063 0.052 0.038 -0.126 0.090
(0.057) (0.126) (0.099) (0.132) (0.074)
treatment 1 -0.174** -0.123 -0.182 0.243 -0.175
× only wife int. (0.087) (0.174) (0.171) (0.194) (0.115)
treatment 2 -0.049 -0.190 -0.043 0.178 -0.140
× only wife int. (0.085) (0.161) (0.135) (0.166) (0.104)
Observations 234 234 139 139 234
β1 + β4 = 0 0.705 0.907 0.646 0.934 0.885
β2 + β5 = 0 0.875 0.378 0.879 0.482 0.687
β1 = β2 0.201 0.052 0.114 0.213 0.324
β1 + β4 = β2 + β5 0.601 0.311 0.729 0.535 0.585
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether only the pri-
mary respondent was interviewd and treated (in the base category, the primary respondent's
husband or family elder was also treated). The sample includes female children aged 13 to 17
at the time of the initial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone sur-
vey conducted 10 months after the initial CiMLAS survey. A variety of controls were included
(but are not shown): age of child, age at child at menarche, whether the primary respondent
(PR) / child's mother was married before age 18, PR's primary education completion status,
PR's knowledge of the correct legal marriage age, PR's knowledge of the correct punishments
for infractions of the child marriage law, PR's awareness of the exception clause, PR's learn-
ing of the law after 2014, and PR's knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. The last 4 rows report the p-values from a number of Wald tests (βi
corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Figures
Figure 1: Change in Appropriate Marriage Age
Note: This gure reports the distribution of the change (between 2014 and 2018) in respon-
dents' responses to the question: what is the appropriate age of marriage for a woman. Source:
2018 CiMLAS and 2014 WiLCAS.
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Appendix
Balance in the Telephone Interview Sample (Female Respondents
with Unmarried Adolescent Daughters)











Age 36.90 36.91 (0.99) 36.45 (0.58)
Schooling 4.16 4.25 (0.88) 3.65 (0.39)
Married 0.95 0.93 (0.59) 0.95 (0.99)
Married before 18 0.69 0.69 (0.98) 0.79 (0.15)
Employed 0.14 0.15 (0.98) 0.12 (0.63)
2014 Norms Index 2 0.01 0.01 (0.99) -0.13 (0.37)
Father Schooling 2.98 3.39 (0.54) 3.43 (0.48)
Mother Schooling 1.63 1.69 (0.89) 1.15 (0.24)
Mother works 0.12 0.08 (0.36) 0.07 (0.29)
Father low pay 0.28 0.26 (0.78) 0.29 (0.90)
Half Acre Land 0.43 0.52 (0.28) 0.46 (0.69)
Adol. girl 13-17 1.19 1.19 (0.98) 1.26 (0.31)
Knows min age 0.92 0.89 (0.54) 0.93 (0.76)
Knows punishment 0.83 0.83 (1.00) 0.87 (0.50)
Knows age exception 0.08 0.10 (0.71) 0.13 (0.33)
Learnt law after 2014 0.23 0.20 (0.67) 0.19 (0.54)
Knows CM court case 0.40 0.30 (0.20) 0.46 (0.39)
Observations 83 89 172 84 167
Note: This table presents average values of baseline characteristics by treatment status for
those individuals with female children aged 13 to 17 at the time of the survey. Columns 3
and 5 display p-values from a t-test of the dierence in means between the control group and
either the Treatment 1 (T1) or Treatment 2 (T2) group. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Comparison of Mean Outcomes











Approp marriage age 18.74 18.79 (0.61) 18.57 (0.06)
Approp. marry b/f 18 0.04 0.03 (0.42) 0.05 (0.32)
Approp age gap 5.47 5.51 (0.81) 5.55 (0.62)
Marriage Agency 0.22 0.21 (0.84) 0.19 (0.29)
Vill. approp. marr. age 17.30 17.32 (0.85) 17.37 (0.51)
Vill. approp. marry b/f 18 0.36 0.39 (0.29) 0.35 (0.62)
Marr a/f 18 bad 0.31 0.29 (0.48) 0.32 (0.58)
Vill expect marr b/f 18 0.46 0.43 (0.32) 0.44 (0.49)
Vill marr a/f 18 bad 0.49 0.49 (0.77) 0.45 (0.12)
Traditional Norms Index -0.01 -0.05 (0.51) 0.06 (0.25)
Traditional Norms Index 2 0.03 -0.06 (0.10) 0.02 (0.83)
Vignette A support 0.91 0.92 (0.83) 0.91 (0.74)
Vignette A others support 0.68 0.68 (0.96) 0.68 (0.95)
VA oth. approve support 0.52 0.47 (0.07) 0.51 (0.77)
Vignette B support 0.62 0.58 (0.17) 0.54 (0.01)
Vignette B others support 0.31 0.31 (0.94) 0.31 (0.99)
VB oth. approve support 0.30 0.30 (1.00) 0.30 (0.98)
Vignette C support 0.70 0.70 (1.00) 0.69 (0.77)
Vignette C others support 0.44 0.41 (0.29) 0.47 (0.32)
VC oth. approve support 0.33 0.31 (0.42) 0.32 (0.53)
Make Contribution 0.39 0.43 (0.20) 0.40 (0.77)
Contribution Amount 24.19 30.07 (0.06) 22.14 (0.45)
Observations 613 556 1169 588 1201
Note: This table presents average values for short term outcome variables by treatment status.
Columns 3 and 5 display p-values from a t-test of the dierence in means between the control
group and either the Treatment 1 (T1) or Treatment 2 (T2) group. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Married 0.01 0.08 (0.04) 0.05 (0.18)
Received Oer 0.37 0.47 (0.17) 0.44 (0.34)
Accepted Oer 0.03 0.21 (0.01) 0.16 (0.07)
Declined Oer 0.65 0.60 (0.73) 0.74 (0.42)
Any Marr. Steps 0.06 0.13 (0.10) 0.12 (0.19)
Observations 84 91 175 86 170
Note: This table presents average values for long term outcome variables by treatment sta-
tus. The data were collected in a phone survey conducted 5 months after the initial CiMLAS
survey and information treatment. Columns 3 and 5 display p-values from a t-test of the dif-
ference in means between the control group and either the Treatment 1 (T1) or Treatment 2
(T2) group. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.












Married 0.05 0.10 (0.23) 0.11 (0.17)
Received Oer 0.52 0.55 (0.75) 0.71 (0.01)
Accepted Oer 0.10 0.24 (0.10) 0.18 (0.28)
Declined Oer 0.82 0.71 (0.24) 0.77 (0.52)
Any Marr. Steps 0.09 0.18 (0.10) 0.16 (0.18)
Observations 77 77 154 80 157
Note: This table presents average values for long term outcome variables by treatment sta-
tus. The data were collected in a phone survey conducted 10 months after the initial CiMLAS
survey and information treatment. Columns 3 and 5 display p-values from a t-test of the dif-
ference in means between the control group and either the Treatment 1 (T1) or Treatment 2
(T2) group. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Average Treatment Eects (No Controls)









treatment 1 0.012 0.019 -0.007 0.001
(0.103) (0.020) (0.011) (0.024)
treatment 2 -0.226** -0.001 0.009 -0.042*
(0.100) (0.019) (0.012) (0.024)
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 18.741 0.117 0.039 0.217
dep var sd 1.643 0.322 0.194 0.413
β1 = β2 0.021 0.361 0.152 0.078
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.










treatment 1 0.039 -0.018 -0.011
(0.117) (0.029) (0.029)
treatment 2 0.133 -0.033 -0.059**
(0.109) (0.028) (0.028)
Observations 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 17.300 0.457 0.494
dep var sd 1.911 0.499 0.500
β1 = β2 0.427 0.598 0.095
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Table 25: ATEs on Traditional Gender Norms
Traditional
Gender Norms Index 1
Traditional
Gender Norms Index 2
treatment 1 -0.061 -0.102*
(0.059) (0.059)
treatment 2 0.017 -0.033
(0.058) (0.058)
Observations 1757 1757
dep var mean -0.010 0.035
dep var sd 0.994 1.004
β1 = β2 0.189 0.251
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.






approve if parents support
treatment 1 0.013 -0.022 -0.056*
(0.017) (0.028) (0.030)
treatment 2 -0.005 -0.011 -0.007
(0.017) (0.027) (0.030)
Observations 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 0.912 0.680 0.522
dep var sd 0.284 0.467 0.500
β1 = β2 0.320 0.709 0.100
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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approve if parents support
treatment 1 -0.038 -0.011 -0.008
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028)
treatment 2 -0.063** 0.002 -0.002
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 1757 1757 1757
dep var mean 0.620 0.315 0.299
dep var sd 0.486 0.465 0.458
β1 = β2 0.400 0.620 0.852
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.






approve if parents support
treatment 1 0.015 -0.029 -0.024
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
treatment 2 0.010 0.021 -0.016
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 1757 1757 1756
dep var mean 0.701 0.439 0.335
dep var sd 0.458 0.497 0.472
β1 = β2 0.847 0.102 0.775
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 0.017 5.851* 0.146*
(0.028) (3.158) (0.083)
treatment 2 -0.018 -1.191 -0.075
(0.027) (2.666) (0.082)
Observations 1757 1757 719
dep var mean 0.395 24.189 3.639
dep var sd 0.489 49.400 0.985
β1 = β2 0.212 0.018 0.008
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables against
treatment status indicators, including village xed eects (not shown). Standard errors are
given in parentheses. The last row reports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in
coecients between T1 and T2 (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row).
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Marriage-Related Outcomes (No Controls)










treatment 1 0.065** 0.103 0.177** -0.041 0.072
(0.031) (0.075) (0.071) (0.115) (0.044)
treatment 2 0.035 0.073 0.126* 0.092 0.057
(0.026) (0.076) (0.068) (0.113) (0.043)
Observations 261 261 112 112 261
dep var mean 0.012 0.369 0.032 0.645 0.060
dep var sd 0.109 0.485 0.180 0.486 0.238
β1 = β2 0.402 0.684 0.555 0.209 0.755
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators for a sample of female children aged 13 to 17 at the time of the ini-
tial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone survey conducted 5 months
after the initial CiMLAS survey. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The last row re-
ports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2 (βi cor-
responds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 0.052 0.026 0.138* -0.111 0.091
(0.043) (0.081) (0.082) (0.093) (0.055)
treatment 2 0.061 0.193** 0.075 -0.053 0.072
(0.044) (0.077) (0.070) (0.083) (0.053)
Observations 234 234 139 139 234
dep var mean 0.036 0.464 0.077 0.846 0.071
dep var sd 0.187 0.502 0.270 0.366 0.259
β1 = β2 0.863 0.030 0.455 0.524 0.750
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators for a sample of female children aged 13 to 17 at the time of the ini-
tial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone survey conducted 5 months
after the initial CiMLAS survey. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The last row re-
ports the p-value from a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2 (βi cor-
responds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
63
Treatment Heterogeneity: Gender (No Controls)









treatment 1 0.131 0.038 -0.015 0.013
(0.108) (0.023) (0.013) (0.028)
treatment 2 -0.062 0.013 0.006 -0.027
(0.110) (0.022) (0.015) (0.028)
Male 0.541*** 0.026 -0.010 0.032
(0.158) (0.029) (0.017) (0.036)
treatment 1 -0.414* -0.068 0.027 -0.044
× Male (0.233) (0.042) (0.025) (0.052)
treatment 2 -0.573*** -0.048 0.012 -0.052
× Male (0.218) (0.042) (0.027) (0.051)
Constant 18.613*** 0.116*** 0.042*** 0.212***
(0.074) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019)
Observations 1757 1757 1757 1757
β1 + β4 = 0 0.191 0.398 0.600 0.490
β2 + β5 = 0 0.001 0.338 0.444 0.074
β1 = β2 0.084 0.314 0.110 0.148
β1 + β4 = β2 + β5 0.092 0.885 0.811 0.279
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators interacted with a dummy variable for gender of respon-
dent. The regressions include village xed eects and a variety of controls (not shown). The
controls include respondent age as well as dummies for respondents' gender, marriage before
age 18, primary education completion, mother's primary education completion, father's own-
ing more than a half acre of land, knowledge of the correct legal marriage age, knowledge of
the correct punishments for infractions of the child marriage law, awareness of the exception
clause, learning of the law after 2014, and knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. The last 4 rows report the p-values from a number of Wald
tests (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 -0.000231 3.544 0.0717
(0.0328) (3.622) (0.0918)
treatment 2 -0.0254 -3.024 -0.145
(0.0314) (3.130) (0.0936)
Male -0.00495 -0.363 -0.0424
(0.0401) (4.098) (0.123)
treatment 1 0.0616 8.295 0.266
× Male (0.0583) (6.572) (0.173)
treatment 2 0.0271 6.997 0.283*
× Male (0.0590) (5.645) (0.171)
Constant 0.411*** 24.00*** 3.650***
(0.0223) (2.274) (0.0622)
Observations 1757 1757 719
β1 + β4 = 0 0.218 0.0393 0.0295
β2 + β5 = 0 0.973 0.410 0.357
β1 = β2 0.436 0.0558 0.0229
β1 + β4 = β2 + β5 0.260 0.156 0.176
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of short term outcome variables
against treatment status indicators interacted with a dummy variable for gender of respon-
dent. The regressions include village xed eects and a variety of controls (not shown). The
controls include respondent age as well as dummies for respondents' gender, marriage before
age 18, primary education completion, mother's primary education completion, father's own-
ing more than a half acre of land, knowledge of the correct legal marriage age, knowledge of
the correct punishments for infractions of the child marriage law, awareness of the exception
clause, learning of the law after 2014, and knowledge of a child marriage legal case. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. The last 4 rows report the p-values from a number of Wald
tests (βi corresponds to the coecient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Treatment Heterogeneity: Treatment of Primary Respondent
Only vs Treatment of Husband or Elder of Primary Respondent
in Addition (No Controls)










treatment 1 0.109** 0.100 0.261*** -0.169 0.129**
(0.046) (0.105) (0.094) (0.145) (0.065)
treatment 2 0.023 0.123 0.087 0.135 0.024
(0.023) (0.106) (0.060) (0.117) (0.049)
only wife int. 0.026 -0.058 0.077 -0.316* 0.035
(0.026) (0.107) (0.076) (0.174) (0.054)
treatment 1 -0.092 -0.007 -0.188 0.308 -0.121
× only wife int. (0.061) (0.150) (0.146) (0.232) (0.089)
treatment 2 0.022 -0.108 0.103 -0.130 0.064
× only wife int. (0.053) (0.151) (0.152) (0.227) (0.088)
Observations 261 261 112 112 261
β1 + β4 = 0 0.670 0.389 0.515 0.447 0.896
β2 + β5 = 0 0.348 0.889 0.178 0.979 0.231
β1 = β2 0.098 0.831 0.123 0.013 0.123
β1 + β4 = β2 + β5 0.580 0.461 0.417 0.445 0.268
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether only the pri-
mary respondent was interviewd and treated (in the base category, the primary respondent's
husband or family elder was also treated). The sample includes female children aged 13 to 17
at the time of the initial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone survey
conducted 5 months after the initial CiMLAS survey. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The last 4 rows report the p-values from a number of Wald tests (βi corresponds to the coe-
cient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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treatment 1 0.144** 0.071 0.288*** -0.284** 0.193***
(0.063) (0.109) (0.108) (0.119) (0.074)
treatment 2 0.049 0.262** 0.080 -0.097 0.097
(0.046) (0.101) (0.075) (0.094) (0.063)
only wife int. 0.071 0.063 0.121 -0.187 0.111
(0.057) (0.117) (0.101) (0.125) (0.072)
treatment 1 -0.210** -0.134 -0.343** 0.395** -0.238**
× only wife int. (0.086) (0.164) (0.160) (0.184) (0.112)
treatment 2 0.015 -0.167 -0.006 0.094 -0.069
× only wife int. (0.092) (0.156) (0.146) (0.170) (0.111)
Observations 234 234 139 139 234
β1 + β4 = 0 0.266 0.611 0.637 0.430 0.591
β2 + β5 = 0 0.420 0.420 0.559 0.988 0.759
β1 = β2 0.180 0.063 0.073 0.130 0.270
β1 + β4 = β2 + β5 0.050 0.171 0.267 0.379 0.379
Note: This table presents the results of OLS regressions of marriage-related outcomes against
treatment status indicators interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether only the pri-
mary respondent was interviewed and treated (in the base category, the primary respondent's
husband or family elder was also treated). The sample includes female children aged 13 to 17
at the time of the initial CiMLAS survey. These outcomes were collected from a phone survey
conducted 5 months after the initial CiMLAS survey. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The last 4 rows report the p-values from a number of Wald tests (βi corresponds to the coe-
cient of the term in the ith row). *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Source: 2018 CiMLAS.
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Perception of Incidence of Early Marriage (With Controls)
Table 36: Perception of Incidence of Early Marriage
Early Marriage Common Early Marriage Not Common
treatment 1 -0.000 0.011
(0.028) (0.027)




Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.
Note: Includes controls for respondent characteristics (not shown).
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
p-value reports a Wald test for a dierence in coecients between T1 and T2.
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Marriage-Related Outcomes in Subsample where Minimum
Legal Age is Known (With Controls)










treatment==1 0.070∗∗ 0.112 0.201∗∗∗ -0.034 0.079
(0.033) (0.074) (0.074) (0.132) (0.049)
treatment==2 0.014 0.055 0.112 0.123 0.036
(0.026) (0.074) (0.075) (0.133) (0.045)
Observations 236 236 104 104 236
dep var mean 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071
dep var sd 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.259
Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.
Note: Includes controls for child characteristics.
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01










treatment==1 0.074 0.048 0.156∗∗ -0.101 0.122∗∗
(0.046) (0.083) (0.077) (0.093) (0.058)
treatment==2 0.032 0.219∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.010 0.054
(0.044) (0.078) (0.070) (0.087) (0.053)
Observations 209 209 128 128 209
dep var mean 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
dep var sd 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332
Source: 2018 CiMLAS and authors' calculations.
Note: Includes controls for child characteristics.




Next I will tell you several stories about people living in villages similar to this one. I would like you to listen to the
stories carefully and answer the questions that follow each one. Some of the questions will ask you to agree or disagree
with a statement.
Vignette A
Jesmin is a 14 year-old girl attending grade 9 in secondary school. She lives with her mother, father, and two older
brothers. Two months ago, her parents received a marriage proposal for Jesmin. The groom is a 32 year-old man from a
neighbouring village. Jesmin told her parents that she would like to nish her schooling before getting married, but her
uncles are pressuring her to accept the marriage oer immediately.
Let's return to the story. Imagine that Jesmin's parents listen to her and refuse the marriage proposal so that Jesmin can
nish school before marrying.
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Vignette B
Rokeya, aged 15, is the eldest of three sisters. She is enrolled in class 10 in secondary school and lives in a village like this
with her mother. Her father passed away a year ago. One day her paternal uncles speak to her mother about an oer of
marriage from a young BCS ocer. Rokeya rmly announces that she is not interested in marrying any time soon.




Rita is a 16 year-old girl attending grade 10 in secondary school. Her mother works in the local primary school, and her
father owns a small dry goods store. One day Rita's parents hear from a neighbour that Rita has been spending a lot of
time with a local boy from her school, and that certain people in the village are gossiping about this. When asked, Rita
admits to a secret engagement with the boy but she wants to nish school before she is married.
Let's return to the story. Imagine that Rita's parents accept Rita's decision to postpone her marriage till she has nished
school.
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